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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI 
 EASTERN DIVISION 
 
ELLIOT WINTER, et. al.,     ) 
) 
               Plaintiffs,    ) 
       ) 
          v.                       ) Case No. 4:21-CV-01046 JAR 
       ) 
FACEBOOK, INC., TIKTOK INC.,   ) 
TIKTOK PTE LTD, BYTEDANCE LTD.,   ) 
BYTEDANCE INC., and MONICA DOLAN, ) 
       ) 
               Defendants.    ) 
 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
On July 9, 2021, Plaintiffs Elliot Winter and Alexandria Hurlburt filed this action against 
Defendants Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”); TikTok Inc., TikTok PTE Ltd., Bytedance Ltd., and 
Bytedance Inc. (“TikTok”)1; and Monica Dolan (“Dolan”), in the Circuit Court of St. Louis City, 
Missouri. See Elliot Winter, et al. v. Facebook, Inc., et al., Case No. 2122-CC08817 (22nd Jud. 
Cir.). Plaintiffs allege that Dolan and others associated with her “engaged in a pattern of behavior 
that resulted in the harassment of the Plaintiffs on her social media accounts” and that “[a]s a direct 
and proximate cause of Facebook and TikTok’s failure to take down [] false abusive posts and/or 
posts containing [P]laintiffs [sic] personal identifying information for the purposes of stalking and 
harassment, [P]laintiffs sustained damages in an amount in excess of $500,000.00.” (Compl. at ¶¶ 
9, 97). Plaintiffs assert claims against Dolan for defamation – slander (Count I); defamation – libel 
(Count II); tortious interference with business contract and expectancy (Count III); invasion of 
 
1 Plaintiffs’ complaint only names TikTok Inc. as a defendant (see Complaint (“Compl.”), Doc. No. 3 at ¶ 
3) and makes no allegations against TikTok Pte Ltd., ByteDance Ltd., and ByteDance Inc., none of whom 
have been served. 
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privacy (Count IV); false light (Count V); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VI); 
stalking (Count VII); harassment (Count VIII); and unlawful posting of certain information over 
the internet (Count IX); and a single claim of “gross negligence” against Facebook and TikTok 
(Count X).  
Facebook, with TikTok’s consent, removed the case to this Court on August 20, 2021 based 
on diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 1). Both Facebook and TikTok have moved to dismiss the case. 
(Doc. Nos. 10, 12). The motions are fully briefed and ready for disposition. Because the arguments 
raised in support of and in opposition to dismissal are largely the same, the Court has addressed 
the motions together. 
Legal standard 
The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is to test the 
legal sufficiency of a complaint to eliminate those actions “which are fatally flawed in their legal 
premises and deigned to fail, thereby sparing the litigants the burden of unnecessary pretrial and 
trial activity.” Young v. City of St. Charles, 244 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 2001). To survive a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that 
is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
A plaintiff need not provide specific facts in support of his allegations, Erickson v. Pardus, 
551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam), but “must include sufficient factual information to provide 
the ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests, and to raise a right to relief above a speculative level.” 
Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 
at 555 & n.3). This obligation requires a plaintiff to plead “more than labels and conclusions, and 
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a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
A complaint “must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material 
elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Id. at 562 (internal citation 
omitted). This standard “simply calls for enough facts to raise reasonable expectation that 
discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim or element].” Id. at 556. The plausibility of the 
plaintiff’s claim is reviewed “as a whole, not plausibility of each individual allegation.” Zoltek 
Corp. v. Structural Polymer Grp., 592 F.3d 893, 896 n.4 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). 
On a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all of the factual allegations contained in 
the complaint, even if it appears that “actual proof of those facts is improbable,” Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 556, and reviews the complaint to determine whether its allegations show that the pleader 
is entitled to relief. Id. at 555-56. The principle that a court must accept as true all of the allegations 
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Although 
legal conclusions can provide the framework for a complaint, they must be supported by factual 
allegations. Id.at 679. 
If a motion to dismiss is granted, a court should normally grant leave to amend unless it 
determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by allegations of other facts. Cornelia I. 
Crowell GST Tr. v. Possis Med., Inc., 519 F.3d 778, 783-84 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Wisdom v. 
First Midwest Bank, 167 F.3d 402, 409 (8th Cir. 1999)). 
Discussion 
Facebook and TikTok argue that Plaintiffs’ negligence claim against them should be 
dismissed for two reasons. First, the claim is barred by § 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
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(“CDA”), which immunizes internet service providers (“ISPs”) against liability arising from 
content created by third parties. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th 
Cir. 2010). Second, Plaintiffs have failed to plead a claim for negligence, and specifically, facts 
establishing the existence of a duty that Facebook and TikTok owed them.  
(1) Communications Decency Act 
In enacting the CDA, Congress made it the “policy of the United States” to “promote the 
continued development of the Internet,” and “preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that 
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or 
State regulation[.]” Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1355-56 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting 47 
U.S.C. § 230(b)(1), (2)). To that end, “Congress decided not to treat providers of interactive 
computer services like other information providers such as newspapers, magazines or television 
and radio stations, all of which may be held liable for publishing obscene or defamatory material 
written or prepared by others.” M.A. ex rel. P.K. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. 
Supp. 2d 1041, 1047-48 (Mo. E.D. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
The CDA provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider,” § 230(c)(1), and expressly preempts any state law to the contrary, 
§ 230(e)(3). Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 790-91 (8th Cir. 2010). The Act defines an 
“information content provider” as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for 
the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive 
computer service.” § 230(f)(3). “Read together, these provisions bar plaintiffs from holding ISPs 
legally responsible for information that third parties created and developed.” Johnson, 614 F.3d at 
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791 (citation omitted); see also East Coast Test Prep LLC v. Allnurses.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 747, 
752 (8th Cir. 2020). “Congress thus established a general rule that providers of interactive 
computer services are liable only for speech that is properly attributable to them.” Johnson, 614 
F.3d at 791 (quoting Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254 (4th 
Cir. 2009)). 
An ancillary goal of the CDA was to “encourage service providers to self-regulate the 
dissemination of offensive material over their services,” by granting them immunity from material 
published by third parties regardless of whether the interactive computer service provider took an 
active role in regulating the content therein. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331. Accordingly, “§ 230 forbids 
the imposition of publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-
regulatory functions.” Id. 
The majority of federal circuits, including the Eighth Circuit, have interpreted the CDA “to 
establish broad ‘federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable 
for information originating with a third-party user of the service.’” Id. at 791 (quoting Almeida v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006)). See, e.g., Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1359 
(affirming dismissal of a claim against Facebook alleging its delay in removing an offensive page 
created by another information content provider constituted intentional assault and negligence); 
Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007) (affirming 
dismissal of a claim brought by a publicly-traded company against an internet message board 
operator for allegedly false and defamatory postings by pseudonymous posters); Batzel v. Smith, 
333 F.3d 1018 1032-33 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that even if operator of internet services could 
have reasonably concluded that the information was sent for internet publication, he was 
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immunized from liability for the defamatory speech as a “provider or user of interactive computer 
services” under the CDA); Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that 
under the CDA the defendant ISP is not liable for failing to monitor, screen, or delete allegedly 
defamatory content from its site); Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 
986 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that defendant ISP was immune to the defamation claim under the 
CDA when it made its own editorial decisions with respect to third-party information published 
on its website); (Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332-34 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the 
CDA barred claims against defendant ISP that allegedly delayed in removing defamatory messages 
posted by unidentified third party, refused to post retractions of those messages, and failed to 
screen for similar postings thereafter).  
District courts in this circuit have reached the same conclusion. See Village Voice Media, 
809 F. Supp. 2d at 1047-48; Gregerson v. Vilana Fin., Inc., No. CIV.06-1164 ADM/AJB, 2008 
WL 451060, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2008) (operator of a website where users can post comments 
is a provider of an interactive computer service and, as such, was not liable for the third-party 
comments posted on his website); Patentwizard, Inc. v. Kinko’s, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1071 
(D.S.D. 2001) (holding that “§ 230 of the Communication[s] Decency Act errs on the side of robust 
communication and prevents the plaintiffs from moving forward with their claims” that a company 
that allowed users to access the internet via its computers could be held liable for the actions of 
one of those users). 
To determine whether § 230 immunity applies, a court must determine whether: (1) the 
defendant is a “provider … of an interactive computer service”; (2) the information for which the 
plaintiff seeks to hold defendant liable is “information provided by another information content 
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provider”; and (3) whether the plaintiff’s claims seek to treat the defendant as a “publisher or 
speaker” of that information. § 230(c)(1); Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1357. On the face of Plaintiffs’ 
complaint, all three elements are satisfied. 
Interactive computer service 
The CDA broadly defines “interactive computer service” as “any information service, 
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to 
a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet[.]” 
§ 230(f)(2). Plaintiffs do not dispute that Facebook and TikTok are “interactive computer 
service[s].” Indeed, courts have found that Facebook qualifies as such. See Caraccioli v. Facebook, 
Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1357-58; Sikhs for 
Justice “SFJ”, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1092-94 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Fraley v. 
Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 801 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Likewise, courts have described video-
sharing websites and social media applications with features similar to TikTok such as YouTube 
and Vimeo, as “interactive computer services.” See Lewis v. Google LLC, 461 F. Supp. 3d 938, 
954 (N.D Cal. 2020); Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 592, 602 (S.D. N.Y. 2020), aff’d, 
991 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2021).  
 Information provided by another content provider 
An “information content provider” is defined as “any person or entity that is responsible, 
in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet 
or any other interactive computer service.” § 230(f)(3). The term “another information content 
provider” refers to any content not provided by the interactive computer service provider itself. 
Wilson v. Twitter, No. 3:20-CV-00054, 2020 WL 3410349, at *11 (S.D. W.Va. May 1, 2020) 
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(citing Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031). This means that Facebook and TikTok would not be immune 
from suit for content they themselves created and published directly but are immune from lawsuits 
stemming from content provided by other individuals they host on their platforms. Id. 
Here, Plaintiffs acknowledge that the objected-to information was provided by third party 
users, “Monica Dolan and Group,” not Facebook or TikTok. The complaint only alleges that 
Facebook and TikTok “refused to remove” the content/accounts posted/held by Dolan and her 
influencers (Compl. at ¶¶ 24, 25); nowhere is it alleged or suggested that Facebook or TikTok 
provided, created, or developed any of the content Plaintiffs allege harmed them. Instead, liability 
is based on “information provided by another information content provider,” within the meaning 
of § 230(c)(1). “A website does not create or develop content when it merely provides a neutral 
means by which third parties can post information of their own independent choosing online.” 
Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1358.  
Treating Facebook and TikTok as publishers or speakers  
Lastly, Plaintiffs are clearly seeking to treat Facebook and TikTok as publishers. (See Doc. 
No. 16 at 5-6; Doc. No. 24 at 5). Under § 230, a cause of action “treat[s]” an entity as a “publisher” 
if it would hold an entity responsible for “deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter 
content.” Johnson, 614 F.3d at 792. Here, Plaintiffs seek to hold Facebook and TikTok liable for 
not removing the content/accounts posted/held by Dolan and her group, which they find 
objectionable. The decision whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content are traditional 
editorial functions of a publisher. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1359 (“Indeed, 
the very essence of publishing is making the decision whether to print or retract a given piece of 
content – the very actions for which Klayman seeks to hold Facebook liable.”).  
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Plaintiffs also seek to hold TikTok liable for removing their social media accounts from its 
platform, yet courts have found that § 230(c)(1) immunity also applies to the situation where a 
plaintiff objects to the removal of his or her own content. See Wilson, 2020 WL 3410349, at *12 
(citing cases).  
In opposition to Facebook and TikTok’s motions, Plaintiffs argue that by failing to follow 
their own Community Standards and taking down content that violates those standards, both 
Facebook and TikTok have acted in “bad faith” and thus cannot be protected under § 230(c)(2), 
the “Good Samaritan” provision of the CDA. (Doc. No. 16 at 6-7; Doc. No. 24 at 6-7). Plaintiffs’ 
argument is unavailing in that it ignores the fact that Facebook and TikTok are claiming immunity 
under § 230(c)(1), which contains no “good faith” requirement. E. Coast Test Prep LLC v. 
Allnurses.com, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d 952, 964 (D. Minn. 2018), aff’d, 971 F.3d 747 (8th Cir. 2020).  
Moreover, Plaintiffs’ argument rests on a misconception about the purpose of the Good 
Samaritan provision. It was inserted not to diminish the broad general immunity provided by § 
230(c)(1), but to assure it is not diminished by the exercise of traditional publisher functions. See 
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (Section 230 was designed “to encourage service providers to self-regulate 
the dissemination of offensive material over their services” without fear they would incur liability 
as a result.). In this respect, the CDA was a response to cases such as Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. 
Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), in which 
an ISP was found liable for defamatory statements posted by third parties because it had voluntarily 
screened and edited some offensive content, and so was considered a “publisher.” Id. at *4. 
“Section 230(c)(1) was meant to undo the perverse incentives created by this reasoning, which 
effectively penalized providers for monitoring content.” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331. As TikTok aptly 
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notes, Plaintiffs’ complaint about selective enforcement of content standards is precisely the type 
of claim Congress intended to preempt in § 230(c)(1). 
Plaintiffs also challenge the constitutionality of § 230, arguing that by enacting § 230, 
Congress has induced online platforms to restrict offensive speech, some of which would 
otherwise be protected under the First Amendment. (Doc. No. 16 at 7-8; Doc. No. 24 at 7-8). 
Plaintiffs cite no authority in support of their contention and numerous courts have rejected similar 
arguments. See Lewis v. Google LLC, 461 F. Supp. 3d 938, 952–53 (N.D. Cal. 2020), aff’d, 851 
F. App’x 723 (9th Cir. 2021) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to Section 230 as “[t]his 
provision does not ban or restrict any speech.”); Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465, 472 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (“Section 230(c)(2) does not require AOL to restrict speech; rather it allows AOL to 
establish standards of decency without risking liability for doing so.”); Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1028 
(“[E]ven though the CDA overall may have had the purpose of restricting content, there is little 
doubt that the Cox–Wyden amendment, which added what ultimately became § 230 to the Act, 
sought to further First Amendment and e-commerce interests on the Internet[.]”). 
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claim that Facebook and TikTok wrongfully 
refused to remove content/accounts posted/held by Dolan and her group is barred under § 230 of 
the CDA. “State-law plaintiffs may hold liable the person who creates or develops unlawful 
content, but not the interactive computer service provider who merely enables that content to be 
posted online.” Nemet, 591 F.3d at 254 (citing Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir.2 
008); Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 
672 (7th Cir. 2008); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31. 
 




Facebook and TikTok argue that Plaintiffs’ negligence claim must also be dismissed 
because they allege no facts giving rise to a duty of care. To state a claim for negligence under 
Missouri law, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant had a duty of care to protect the plaintiff 
from injury; the defendant failed in performing the duty; and the defendant’s failure proximately 
caused harm to the plaintiff. A.O.A. v. Rennert, 350 F. Supp. 3d 818, 840 (E.D. Mo. 2018) (citing 
Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Co-op., Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151, 155 (Mo. banc 2000)); Wise v. HSBC 
Mortg. Corp., No. 4:15-CV-911, 2015 WL 6796955, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 6, 2015). Missouri does 
not recognize degrees of negligence and therefore does not distinguish between negligence and 
gross negligence. Netherlands Ins. Co. v. Cellar Advisors, LLC, No. 4:17-CV-2585 PLC, 2019 
WL 296536, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 2019) (citing Fowler v. Park Corp., 673 S.W.2d 749, 755 
(Mo. banc. 1984)); Rosemann v. Sigillito, 956 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1109 (E.D. Mo. 2013).  
Whether a duty exists is a question of law to be decided by the Court. Vasquez v. Hill, No. 
4:11CV01561AGF, 2012 WL 6568474, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 17, 2012) (citing Hackmann v. 
Missouri American Water Co., 308 S.W.3d 237, 239 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009)). A legal duty owed by 
one to another may arise from at least three sources: (1) it may be prescribed by the legislative 
branch; (2) it may arise because the law imposes a duty based on the relationship between the 
parties or because under a particular set of circumstances an actor must exercise due care to avoid 
foreseeable injury; or (3) it may arise because a party has assumed a duty by contract or agreement 
whether written or oral. Id.  
Here, Plaintiffs contend that Facebook and TikTok created a duty by promulgating 
Community Standards for their published content, thereby implicitly acknowledging the 
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foreseeability of harm resulting from the content its users publish. Plaintiffs argue that Facebook 
and TikTok breached that duty by failing to remove content that violated their Community 
Standards after being made aware of Dolan’s violations. Notably, the complaint does not describe 
the allegedly defamatory content, Facebook or TikTok’s Community Standards, or how that 
content violated those standards.  
To the extent Plaintiffs contend that the promulgation of Community Standards gives rise 
to a state-law duty of care in publishing, that argument has been rejected. “[S]tate law cannot 
predicate liability for publishing decisions on the mere existence of the very relationship that 
Congress immunized from suit.” Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1359-60. The CDA “allows [computer 
service providers] to establish standards of decency without risking liability for doing so.” Bennett 
v. Google, LLC, 882 F.3d 1163, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Green, 318 F.3d at 723). Again, 
“[n]one of this means … that the original culpable party who posts defamatory messages [will] 
escape accountability.” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. It means only that, if Plaintiffs take issue with the 
posts and accounts of Dolan and her group, their legal remedy is against Dolan as the content 
provider, and not against Facebook and TikTok as the publisher. 
Leave to amend 
Although amendment of a complaint should be allowed liberally to ensure that a case is 
decided on its merits, there is no absolute right to amend. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); Ferguson v. 
Cape Girardeau Cty., 88 F.3d 647, 651 (8th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Leave need not be 
granted where amendment would be futile. Id. That is the situation here. Because Plaintiffs’ claim 
against Facebook and TikTok is barred as a matter of law by § 230(c) of the CDA, the Court finds 
that allowing for its amendment would be futile. See Caraccioli, 167 F. Supp. 3d at 1067; Sikhs 




for Justice, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1095-96. Accordingly, Count X will be dismissed without leave to 
amend. 
For these reasons,   
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that TikTok Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss [10] is GRANTED.  
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Facebook Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss [12] is 
GRANTED. 
 
Dated this 22nd day of November, 2021.  
 
 
      _______________________________ 
JOHN A. ROSS 
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